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Chandler v. County Commissioners of
Nantucket County: Why the Massachusetts
Statute Authorizing Takings by
Eminent Domain for Highway
Purposes Should Not Serve as a Mechanism
for Conservation
JOHN TENAGLIA*
I. Introduction
Massachusetts, like many other states along the eastern sea-
board, utilizes the natural beauty of its coastline to fuel its state
economy. Massachusetts' 1,500 miles of coastline has made the
New England state a vacation destination for many. Businesses,
tourists, and Massachusetts residents alike are attracted to the
state's coastline for the wide range of opportunities it offers.' Ac-
cording to a recent report by the Coastal Alliance, the coastal in-
dustries contribute approximately $70.7 billion to the
Massachusetts economy. 2 Since tourism, shipping, and commer-
cial fishing industries are among the most important contributors
to the state economy, protecting and preserving Massachusetts'
coastal resources is paramount. 3 Nantucket is one of the more
popular coastal resorts in Massachusetts that places an emphasis
on coastal and environmental conservation.
Nantucket is a fifty-square mile island situated about sixteen
miles south of the Cape Cod shoreline.4 Known for its history,
well-preserved architecture, and beautiful beaches, Nantucket
has served as a vacation resort for thousands, particularly during
* John Tenaglia, J.D. candidate, degree expected May 2004 from Pace Univer-
sity School of Law.
1. MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, ABOUT THE MASSA-
CHUSETTS OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, at http://www.state.ma.us/czm/
aboutCZM.htm (last modified Oct. 9, 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
NARRATIVE ON NANTUCKET, at http://www.state.ma.us/dhcd/profile/201.pdf.
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the summer months. 5 Indeed, the island's economy is based in
large part on tourism. 6 Nantucket has a year-round population of
slightly over 6,000 residents, while the town sees a spike of ap-
proximately 30,000 people in the month of August.7 Visitors trav-
eling to the island either by air or via the ferry service are
attracted to Nantucket for its beaches and clean environment., In
order to ensure the preservation of these valuable natural re-
sources, the Nantucket Land Bank ("Land Bank") was founded in
1984. 9 The Land Bank, which receives funding from local real es-
tate transaction fees, has purchased over 1,000 acres of open space
to date. 10 However, conservation efforts can be and have been, at
times, at odds with Nantucket's other major industry, second-
home development. 1 The island's beauty has led many visitors to
invest in vacation homes on the island-beachfront properties
have been among the most desirable and expensive. Thus, there
is no surprise that tensions run high when the island's conserva-
tion efforts and the interests of beachfront property owners
collide.
In the past fifteen years, the Supreme Court has attempted to
define more clearly the authority of governing bodies with respect
to regulatory takings. 12 Cases such as First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles, 13 Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission,14 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission,15
and Dollan v. City of Tigardx6 have established a general frame-
work from which state and local governing bodies may regulate
private land use. A governing body may convert private property
to public use by exercising the right of eminent domain.' 7
Eminent domain is an inherent power of a governmental en-
tity to take privately owned property, especially land, and convert
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. See Gregor I. McGregor, The Police Power and Regulatory Takings, 3 MAss.
ENVTL. L. § 29.1 (2002).
13. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
14. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
15. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
16. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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it to public use, subject to reasonable compensation for the tak-
ing.18 State statutes delegate which government entities have the
authority to take land, the process by which a taking must be ef-
fectuated, the formula for providing adequate compensation, and
approaches for dealing with many types of unique takings situa-
tions. 19 Takings statutes are a governing reality because they em-
power state and local governments to take privately owned land
when the needs of a state and/or local community dictate. How-
ever, the right to property, particularly the enjoyment of one's
property, is a fundamental right articulated in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution; 20 thus, tension may exist in the
takings process, even when such taking is legally permissible. In
Massachusetts, as in many states, common law has attempted to
combat this tension by requiring that an authority, in exercising
the right of eminent domain, strictly observe the enabling
statute. 2
1
The tension between a local authority attempting to exercise
the right of eminent domain and private landowners objecting is
illustrated in the case of Chandler v. County Commissioners of
Nantucket County.22 There, local county commissioners (the
"Commissioners") were petitioned to exercise the right of eminent
domain over beachfront private property in the Surfside area of
Nantucket County.23 Plaintiffs, landowners in the Surfside Asso-
ciation, brought a certiorari action 24 against the Commissioners in
protest of the takings. 25 The Commissioners sought to take land
in order to preserve public access to the beach since the "historic
rights of way" to the beach were submerged under water as a re-
sult of beach erosion.26 However, the plaintiffs argued that the
Commissioners' purpose for taking the land was to establish pub-
lic access rights to the beach over the plaintiffs' privately owned
18. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY 541 (7th ed. 1999).
19. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 79, § 1 (West 1999).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See Chwalekv. City of Pitsfield, 329 N.E.2d 156 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975); McAu-
liffe & Burke Co. v. Boston Hous. Auth., 133 N.E.2d 493 (Mass. 1956); Shea v. Inspec-
tor of Bldgs., 83 N.E.2d 457 (Mass. 1949); Walker v. City of Medford, 172 N.E. 248
(Mass. 1930).
22. 772 N.E.2d 578 (Mass. 2002).
23. Id. at 579.
24. "An extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, di-
recting a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review." BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
25. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 579.
26. Id. at 579-80.
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land, which was not supported by the statute under which the
Commissioners were proceeding. 27 The Commissioners proceeded
under a statute which granted them the authority to take land
"necessary, for the purpose of laying out, altering or relocating a
highway .... ,,28 The issue in the case was whether the Commis-
sioners could proceed with the taking under Massachusetts Gen-
eral Law Annotated, chapter 82 ("Chapter 82"), section 7, even if
they had no intention of laying out, altering, or relocating a high-
way over the land subject to the takings.
The Chandler case is significant for two reasons. First, the
case illustrates that any governmental authority exercising its
power of eminent domain must do so in strict conformity with the
enabling statute.29 Second, the court's statutory analysis of the
enabling statute illustrates how a court should scrutinize a gov-
ernmental authority's actions, like that of the Commissioners',
when such actions are challenged for being outside of the statu-
tory grant of authority.30 In Chandler, the court conducted a plain
meaning analysis of the statute in question, relied on extrinsic ev-
idence such as legislative history, and applied the cannons of stat-
utory construction in ascertaining the statute's true meaning. 31
The court also suggested, in dictum, that the Commissioners had
more plausible statutory avenues they could have traveled in or-
der to effectuate a valid taking.32 The court's holding and reason-
ing explains that a governmental authority, like the
Commissioners, can be challenged on a takings order if it fails to
connect its purpose for the taking with the appropriate statutory
authority. 33
This casenote is divided into four sections. Part II of the case-
note provides background on some of the statutes and cases the
Chandler court considered in rendering its decision. Part III is a
27. Id. at 579.
28. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 82, § 7 (West 1999).
29. See Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 579.
30. Id. See also Perry v. Commonwealth, 780 N.E.2d 53 (Mass. 2002); Wong v.
Univ. of Mass., 777 N.E.2d 161 (Mass. 2002).
31. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 582-85.
32. Id. at 585. See also MAss GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 34, § 25 (West 1999); MASs.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 8C (West 1999); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40, § 14 (West
1999).
33. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 579. See also City of Tacoma v. State, 29 P. 847
(Wash. 1892) (holding that eminent domain authority is improper where legislature
fails to prescribe process by which such authority is executed); Harden v. Superior
Court, 284 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1955) (holding that statute did not confer upon city the author-
ity to exercise eminent domain power outside of the city limits).
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discussion of the Chandler case, which outlines the case from its
facts and procedural history to its holding and reasoning. Part IV
of the casenote provides a more detailed analysis of the court's de-
cision, including how the court framed the issue, a review of its
statutory analysis, and the significance of the decision. In part V,
the casenote concludes with a summary of the court's holding and
judgment and a commentary on why Chandler was properly
decided.
II. Background
A Massachusetts town's authority to take privately owned
property exists only where the state legislature has delegated
power in express terms or by necessary implication. 34 In most
states, legislatures pass laws that delegate this authority when
certain conditions are satisfied. In Massachusetts, county com-
missioners are empowered to take land for the following purpose:
If it is necessary, for the purpose of laying out, altering or relo-
cating a highway, or establishing a building line in connection
therewith, . . . the commissioners shall, at the same time that
the highway is laid out, altered or relocated, take such land,
easement or right by eminent domain under chapter seventy-
nine.3 5
The relevant question posed by the construction of this statute in
Chandler was its scope. The statute on its face authorizes takings
for the purpose of "laying out, altering or relocating a highway"
when necessary;36 however, the determinative question was how
the terms "highway" and "necessary" were to be defined and
applied.
The word "highway" denotes "ways laid out or constructed to
accommodate modes of travel and other related purposes that
change as customs change and as technology develops." 37 Al-
though relevant, this definition only took the Chandler court so
far. The more significant determination was when such authority
was to be exercised. The court observed that under Chapter 82,
three different sections refer to the term "common convenience
34. See Trs. of Reservations v. Town of Stockbridge, 204 N.E.2d 463 (Mass. 1965).
35. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 82, § 7 (West 1999).
36. Id.
37. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 352 N.E.2d 197 (Mass. 1976).
2232003]
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and necessity" in explaining when a highway should be laid out,
repaired, or altered.38 For instance, section 32A states:
[U]pon finding that a city or town way or public way has become
abandoned and unused for ordinary travel and that the common
convenience and necessity no longer requires said town way or
public way to be maintained in a condition reasonably safe and
convenient for travel, shall declare that the city or town shall no
longer be bound to keep such way or public way in repair .... 39
In reading this section in conjunction with other relevant sections
of the statute, the court concluded that the purpose of Chapter 82
was to authorize the exercise of eminent domain solely when the
construction or repair of the road is necessary for travel.40
The legislative history of Chapter 82, section 7, supported the
court's conclusion that the statute was intended to be narrowly
construed. 41 In discussing the historical evolution of the statute,
the court explained that when it was first enacted in 1639, the
statute stated that "[tlo the end there may be convenient High-
wayes for Travellers... all Country Highwayes shall be such as
may be most easie and safe for Travellers."42 In 1693, the high-
way statute was modified. The purpose remained highway con-
struction for the purpose of travel, 43 but such highways were to be
constructed only when judged to be of "common necessity or con-
venienc[e]. "44 In 1825, the General Court repealed all prior high-
way statutes and enacted a new law. However, the statute
remained committed to highway construction, while adding a duty
for the roads to be constructed, relocated, or repaired in an effort
to promote the public interest.45 The 1825 statute has undergone
minor changes in its evolution to the current version of Chapter
82, section 7.46
When there is a taking by eminent domain, the Commission-
ers' procedure must be derived from the enabling statute. 47 This
38. MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 82, §§ 2, 4, 32A (West 1999).
39. Id. § 32A (1999).
40. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 583.
41. Id. at 583-84.
42. Id. at 584.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 584-85 (explaining subsequent amendments of the
1825 statute).
47. See Curtis v. City of Boston, 142 N.E. 95 (Mass. 1924); State v. McCook, 147
A. 126 (Conn. 1929); Rochester Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 30 N.E. 1008 (N.Y. 1892).
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notion of strict adherence to statutory authority is a requirement
that authorities, in exercising the power of eminent domain, must
observe in order for the taking to be valid.48 A challenge to the
exercise of eminent domain may be raised only by "owners or oc-
cupiers of land to be taken, and possibly such owners or occupiers
of land to be specially and peculiarly injured as may have a right
to damages[,I" and although other persons may be heard, "they
are not persons interested, and cannot cause the decree to be re-
viewed by certiorari."49 The Massachusetts legislature has pro-
vided a statutory procedure which includes a hearing to an
interested person who objects to a proposed takings plan. 50
III. Discussion
On September 21, 1998, sixteen citizens of Nantucket, pursu-
ant to Chapter 82, section 2, petitioned the Commissioners re-
questing that they lay out for highway purposes and acquire by
eminent domain the fee simple title to certain land in the Surfside
area of the island.5' On December 8, 1999 the Commissioners
held a public hearing, wherein, the proposed taking was dis-
cussed, particularly with regard to the privately owned beach-
front rights-of-way, which were approximately 200 feet apart.52
At the hearing, the Commissioners observed an old subdivision
grid plan recorded in 1889, which indicated that most of the ways
marked on the plan were never laid out, improved, used, or dedi-
cated as streets. 53 In fact, over the past 100-plus years, it became
clear that, due to erosion, many of the ways were either partially
or completely under water. 54 Several of the private landowners
(the "Landowners") present at the hearing objected to the pro-
posed plan, which prompted a second hearing.55
At the second hearing, the Commissioners presented a re-
vised takings plan that excluded the land submerged under
48. See Chwalek v. City of Pitsfield, 329 N.E.2d 152, 157 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975);
McAuliffe & Burke Co. v. Boston Hous. Auth., 133 N.E.2d 493, 495 (Mass. 1956); Shea
v. Inspector of Bldgs, 83 N.E.2d 457, 458 (Mass. 1930).
49. L'Homme v. Town of Winchendon, 192 N.E. 614, 615 (Mass. 1934) (citations
omitted). See also State ex rel. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Barton, 30 N.W. 454 (Minn.
1886).
50. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 82, § 5 (West 1999).
51. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 579.
52. Id. at 580.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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water. 56 In further support of the plan, a letter to the Commis-
sioners from the Nantucket Planning and Economic Development
Commission (NPDC) stated "its strong support for the efforts...
to acquire rights of way to shoreline access in the Surfside area."57
The Commissioners argued that the taking was consistent with
the NPDC's "goal of acquiring twenty five percent of the shoreline
by the year 2025."58 The Landowners challenged the Commission-
ers as to their lack of a conservation plan for the land in question
and as to the legality of the taking under Chapter 82.59 The Land-
owners argued that the Commissioners were acting outside of the
said statute.60 The Commissioners responded to the Landowners'
argument by claiming that they had "no plan to do anything with
the land" and claimed that the purpose of the taking was to "en-
sure that generation upon generation upon generation can use the
... rights of way to the ocean without landowners blocking them
off."61
The Commissioners, in the midst of this second hearing, ex-
plicitly stated their desire not to pave a road on the land taken for
a long time, but elaborated on reasons why said land was the sub-
ject of the taking.62 First, the Commissioners asserted that they
would be "preserving historic rights [of way] to the sea."63 The
Commissioners were concerned that future landowners would not
be as "willing" as current landowners to allow people access over
their property to the beach. 64 The Commissioners claimed that in
taking this land, they would be in a better position to manage the
"assets" and ensure things like better parking in the area and ac-
cess for emergency vehicles. 65 After the vote was taken, a Nan-
tucket resident placed an article on the Nantucket town meeting;
a "warrant 'to repeal, amend or veto' the takings, or in the alterna-
tive, to 'enact takings in the Surfside area pursuant to a beach
access management plan to be formulated in conjunction with
Surfside residents and Massachusetts Coastal Zone Manage-
56. Id.
57. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d at 580.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d at 580.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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ment."' 66 The article failed to achieve the two-thirds majority vote
needed to pass.67
The land subject to the taking consisted of fourteen forty-foot
wide strips of land ranging in length from roughly 250 to 2,200
feet, located within a primarily unpopulated one-half-mile area of
the beach and beachfront property.68 Twelve of the fourteen
strips ran perpendicular to the ocean at approximately 200-foot
intervals, and all but one of the strips were laid out partly in the
sand and terminated in the ocean. 69 The other two proposed
strips paralleled the shoreline, and one lay entirely on the sand.70
One-half to one-third of the total area of land subject to the taking
was laid out on the beach and sand seaward of a clearly delineated
coastal bank and subject to the "ebb and flow of the tide."71 The
plaintiffs claimed that the revised takings plan took roughly two
acres of coastal beach. 72
In the Supreme Judicial Court of the County of Suffolk, the
plaintiffs requested an injunction barring the Commissioners
from recording or registering any order of taking in accordance
with the January 26, 2000 vote. 73 The plaintiffs sought a declara-
tion that the Commissioners' actions were not a valid exercise of
their authority under Chapter 82, and requested a judgment to
quash.74 The case was transferred to the Superior Court, where
the plaintiffs, after filing the administrative record of the proceed-
ings before the Commissioners, moved for judgment on the plead-
ings.75 After a hearing, the motion was denied and the complaint
was dismissed.76 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
granted the plaintiffs' application for direct appellate review. 77
The plaintiffs argued that the purpose of the takings orders
was to establish access rights to the beach over their property;78
thus, the takings were not authorized under Chapter 82, section
66. Id. at 581.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d at 581.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d at 581.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 579.
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7.79 Indeed, the Commissioners conceded that they had no inten-
tion of taking the land to build or improve a roadway, but rather,
were using their authority to "preserve historic rights [of way] to
the sea."s0 The Commissioners argued that the ways or land
taken, "consist either of connections to existing public ways or are
newly established public ways for preserving historic rights of way
connecting one portion of the island to another."81 The Commis-
sioners further argued that pavement of the land taken was not
necessary under Chapter 82 and thus they acted within the au-
thority of the statute.8 2
The court articulated that the issue in the case was whether
the takings exceeded the proper scope of the Commissioners'
power under Chapter 82.83 In summarizing the key facts, the
court defined the issue more narrowly as:
[W]hether land may be taken under G.L. c. 82 in effect to ac-
quire beach areas for public use, and to prevent the owners of
the land contiguous to that beach from inhibiting the public
from traversing their land, where the taking authority has ex-
pressly disavowed any intention of building a highway.8 4
The court held that the land may not be taken under Chapter 82
and vacated the takings orders.8 5 The court reasoned that the
Commissioners' actions were invalid because they went beyond
the scope of Chapter 82, section 7.86
In reaching its conclusion, the court first engaged in a statu-
tory analysis to determine the power of the Commissioners and
whether they reached beyond it. First, the court found that Chap-
ter 82, section 1, authorized the Commissioners to "lay out, alter,
relocate and discontinue highways and order specific repairs
thereon."87 In conjunction with that authority, section 7 of the
statute empowered the Commissioners to take by eminent domain
the land "necessary" for the purposes of laying out, altering or
relocating such highways or establishing lines in connection
79. Id.
80. Id. at 580.
81. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d at 586 (quoting Commissioners brief).
82. Id. at 583.
83. Id. at 579.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 579, 586.
86. Id. at 582.
87. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d at 582 (quoting statutory language cited therein).
[Vol. 21228
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therewith.88 The court, in looking at the language of the statute,
explained that central to the exercise of this authority was deter-
mining when it could be exercised.8 9 The court reasoned that the
language, "common convenience and necessity," which appeared
in three different sections of Chapter 82, was to be given one con-
sistent meaning.90 The court explained that "common conve-
nience and necessity" meant that a new, altered, or repaired
highway must be "required" to facilitate "reasonably safe and con-
venient ... travel."91 Read as a whole, the court concluded that
Chapter 82 authorizes takings for a new highway only where the
construction or physical improvement of a highway "necessary for
travel" is contemplated. 92
After ascertaining a permissible basis for action under Chap-
ter 82, the court considered whether the Commissioners' actions
were within the scope of the statute.93 The court rejected the
Commissioners' argument that the land taken "consist[s] either of
connections to existing public ways or are newly established pub-
lic ways for preserving historic rights of way connecting one por-
tion of the island to another."94 The court reasoned that the
Commissioners had specifically disavowed any intent to build
roadways on the land taken and thus, the stated goals of "preserv-
ing historic rights of way" and connecting on paper "existing pub-
lic ways," did not bring the takings within the scope of Chapter
82. 9 5 The court went on to explain that the Commissioners in-
tended to lay out only "paper" roads by these takings, but, without
more, the lines on paper failed to establish the takings for high-
way purposes under Chapter 82.96 The court reversed the judg-
ment of the Superior Court and vacated the takings orders
enacted under Chapter 82, section 7.97
88. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 82, § 7 (West 1999).
89. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 582.
90. Id. (citing Arnold v. Comm'rs of Corps. & Taxation, 100 N.E.2d 851 (Mass.
1951)).
91. Id. at 583 (quoting statutory language cited therein).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 582.
94. Id. at 586 (quoting Commissioners brief).
95. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d at 586.
96. Id. (comparing Perry v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket, 444 N.E.2d 389 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1983)).
97. Id.
20031 229
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IV. Analysis
In rendering its decision, the court properly analyzed the lan-
guage of the enabling statute and the Commissioners' authority
and purpose for the taking. In its analysis, the court acknowl-
edged that the "Commissioners have long exercised broad discre-
tion in determining whether a new highway is warranted."98
Although certiorari review of such discretionary action is not typi-
cally available, the court concluded that such review is appropri-
ate when determining if an action was arbitrary and capricious. 99
Here, the plaintiffs' principle challenge to the takings orders was
that the Commissioners were not acting in accord with Chapter
82, section 7, which essentially argued they were proceeding arbi-
trarily.100 Indeed, in an eminent domain proceeding, the acting
authority (here, the Commissioners) must be sure to take action in
strict observance of the enabling statute. 101 Thus, since the Com-
missioners were challenged for acting outside the authority of
Chapter 82, the court applied the appropriate standard of review.
The court reached its determination of the appropriate stan-
dard of review because it properly framed the issue in the case.
The court stated that the general issue in the case was whether
the takings exceeded the proper scope of the Commissioners'
power under Chapter 82.102 The validity of the takings order was
to be determined by the scope of Chapter 82, particularly if it au-
thorized the Commissioners to acquire privately owned beach ar-
eas for public use while disavowing any intent to build a
highway. 10 3 The framing of the issue and subsequent analysis
emphasized the need for governing authorities, like the Commis-
sioners, to strictly conform to the appropriate enabling statute.
The court began its analysis in Chandler with a plain reading
of Chapter 82, section 7.104 The court explained that it interprets
a statute "according to the intent of the Legislature ascertained
98. Id. at 581.
99. Id. at 581-82 (citing Emerson College v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1098
(Mass. 1984)). See also Brazil v. Sibley County, 166 N.W. 1077 (Minn. 1918).
100. Contra McMichael v. County Comm'rs, 197 N.E.2d 883 (Mass. 1964) (holding
petition was properly denied since the petition did not allege facts showing any failure
to comply with applicable statutory provisions).
101. See Chwalek v. City of Pitsfield, 329 N.E.2d 156, 157 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975);
McAuliffe & Burke Co. v. Boston Hous. Auth., 133 N.E.2d 493, 495 (Mass. 1956); Shea
v. Inspector of Bldgs., 83 N.E.2d 457, 458 (Mass. 1949); Walker v. City of Medford,
172 N.E. 248, 250 (Mass. 1930).
102. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 579.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 581-82.
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from all its words construed by the ordinary and approved usage
of the language ... to the end that the purpose of its framers may
be effectuated. "10 5 From the language in Chapter 82, section 1, it
is clear that the Commissioners possessed the authority to con-
struct and alter highways and order repairs thereon. It was also
apparent that the Commissioners, under Chapter 82, section 7,
were empowered to exercise this authority through the acquisition
of land by eminent domain.10 6 However, the court's analysis be-
came more difficult when trying to determine if such authority
could be exercised in the absence of physically paving a roadway
or path on the taken land.
In arriving at a determination as to scope of the Commission-
ers' authority under Chapter 82, section 7, the court analyzed, ac-
cording to canons of statutory construction, multiple provisions of
Chapter 82.107 The court noted that nine different sections of
Chapter 82 referred to the construction of roadways.' 0 8 The court
concluded that, read as a whole, Chapter 82 authorized takings
for a new highway only where the construction or physical im-
provement of a highway for travel is contemplated, 10 9 a reading
that was supported by the court's "plain language" analysis.
The court's interpretation of Chapter 82 hinged on defining
the phrase "common convenience and necessity."110 This lan-
guage, which appeared in three different places in the statute, led
the court to appropriately prescribe one consistent meaning. 11
Section 32A explicitly states that if in the interest of "common con-
venience and necessity," there is a need for public ways to be
maintained in a condition "reasonably safe and convenient for
travel."1" 2 Other sections of the statute, besides section 7, support
the interpretation of physical construction or repair of roadways.
Section 10 of the statute empowers commissioners "[alt the time of
the ordering specific repairs upon a highway, [to] direct it to be
closed for public travel for a reasonable time."1 13 Section 12 per-
105. Id. at 582 (quoting Hanlon v. Rollins, 190 N.E. 606, 608 (1934)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 582-83.
108. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d at 582. See also MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 82, §§ 8, 9,
llA, 12, 14, 24, 25, 35, 38 (West 1999).
109. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 583.
110. Id. at 582.
111. Id. (citing Arnold v. Comm'rs of Corps. & Taxation, 100 N.E.2d 851 (Mass.
1951)). See also MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 82 §§ 2, 4, 32A (1999).
112. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 82, § 32A.
113. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 82, § 10.
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mits commissioners to allocate the "cost of construction" among
the county or towns where the "highway" is located. 114 Although
these provisions, among others, supported the court's initial inter-
pretation of the meaning and scope of the statute, the court deep-
ened its analysis.
The court decided to rely on extrinsic evidence, in the form of
legislative history, to further aid in its interpretation of Chapter
82, section 7.115 The legislative history further supported the
court's conclusion that the purpose of Chapter 82, section 7, was
for the Commissioners to acquire land for the construction or al-
teration of a highway for travel when common convenience and
necessity dictate.'1 6 The court's research of over 300 years of the
statute's legislative history indicated that the purpose of the legis-
lation was and has remained the construction, alteration, or re-
pair of highways to accommodate travel." 7 Although the statute
has not been free from change since its enactment in 1639, the
statute's purpose of efficient roadways for travel has remained the
same.' 18 Thus, the Commissioners' proposed takings to preserve
and conserve public access to the beach are not supported by any
reading or interpretation of Chapter 82, section 7.
The issue of coastal conservation is complex and involves a
number of different issues and players at both the state and local
levels. Beach erosion is a natural phenomenon and reality that
exists along the Pacific, Atlantic, and Gulf coasts of the United
States." 9 Coastal erosion is caused by a number of factors, which
can be placed into two broad categories: (1) sand migration along
the shore, and (2) rising sea levels.' 20 Although the general
causes of beach erosion may be identified, states along the Pacific,
Atlantic, and Gulf coasts seem to address the problem in different
ways. Many densely developed resorts engage in an expensive
process referred to as beach nourishment, the periodic pumping of
sand onto the beach.' 21 In lightly developed areas, many states
114. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 82, § 12.
115. See Barclay v. Deveau, 429 N.E.2d 323 (Mass. 1981); J.A.L. v. Wisconsin, 471
N.W.2d 493 (Wis. 1991); Kaczorowski v. Mayor of Baltimore, 525 A.2d 628 (Md. 1987);
Doctors Council v. New York City Employees' Ret. Sys., 525 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1988).
116. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 580.
117. Id. at 584.
118. Id. at 585.
119. See James G. Titus, Rising Seas, Coastal Erosion, and the Takings Clause:
How to Save Wetlands and Beaches without Hurting Property Owners, 57 MD. L. REV.
1279 (1998).
120. Id. at 1298-99.
121. Id. at 1299.
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focus on preventing the erection of structures that would impede
the natural erosion of the shore, 122 while other state and coastal
towns require new construction to be "setback from the shore by
forty to one-hundred times the annual rate of erosion."'
123
Whatever remedies a coastal state or local town chooses, the fact
remains that careful planning is required for effective
implementation.
Beach erosion is a serious concern for coastal resort towns
like Nantucket since smaller beaches can have a negative impact
on the tourism industry. However, combating the problems
caused by beach erosion can be complex and expensive since a
careful balancing of science, law, and public policy is required.124
Therefore, efforts to control or combat the effects of erosion and
preserve beach access require the collaboration of several govern-
ment agencies at the state and local level. In Massachusetts, the
Coastal Management Program is implemented through several
agencies within the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
("EOEA") and through the coordination efforts of the Massachu-
setts Office of Coastal Zone Management ("CZM"). 125 CZM brings
together marine specialists to work with regional coordinators and
local governments in order to effectively conserve the state's coast-
line. 126 Nantucket's Economic Development Commission, Conser-
vation Foundation, and Land Council are the local bodies
responsible for assessing costal conservation needs and developing
a strategy for implementation.127 The existence of these agencies
and the statutes requiring the submission of a coastal manage-
ment plan places in perspective why the Nantucket Commission-
ers were trying to proceed under Chapter 82.
It is undisputed that a subdivision grid plan recorded in 1889
with the Nantucket County registry of deeds indicated that many
of the ways provided for beach access have fallen victim to ero-
sion.' 28 Indeed, several of the ways are now partially or com-
122. Id. at 1300.
123. Id. at 1301.
124. MASSACHUSETTS OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, ABOUT THE MASSA-
CHUSETTS OFFICE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT, at http://www.state.ma.us/czm/
aboutCZM.htm (last modified Oct. 9, 2003).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See TowN OF NANTUCKET, TOWN DEPARTMENTS, at http://www.nantucket-
ma.gov/departments.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
128. See Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 580.
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pletely under water.129 Thus, a plausible argument exists that
there is a need to preserve some of the ways subject to the taking
for the sake of ensuring public access to the beach and ensuring
the ability to manage the beach "assets." This argument is
strengthened by the fact that open access to the beach is critical to
a vibrant Nantucket tourism industry. However, the Commis-
sioners do not have the authority to lay highways over navigable
waters or on land below high water mark.130 Further, this need
for beach access does not authorize the Commissioners to use the
highway statute as a device for conservation. Simply stated, the
Commissioners' intent is suspect in light of the fact that the Mas-
sachusetts' Legislature has provided other avenues for commis-
sioners to travel in pursuit of conservation. 131
Andrew J. Ley, counsel for the plaintiffs in the Chandler case,
questioned the town planners' motivations in this matter. 13 2 He
suggests that the Surfside town counsel appeared to support pro-
moting tourism through the taking because they openly stated at
the first public hearing that the takings procedure under the high-
way statute was proper.1 33 The intent to promote tourism was
also evidenced during the public hearings when the Commission-
ers mentioned preserving historic rights of way to the beach and
potentially creating parking spaces for the public on the land.'
34
The Commissioners voiced their concern, during said hearings,
that the private landowners would block public access to the
beach, a result that could impair tourism. 35 Promoting tourism
in a beach resort is a permissible objective for town planners and
town council, particularly where many of the beach access points
are in private hands; however, the means for opening beach access
points must be legal. In this case, the town council's support was
misplaced since the Commissioners were acting outside of the au-
thority granted by Chapter 82, section 7.
129. Id.
130. Inhabitants of Marblehead v. County Comm'rs, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 451, 452
(1855); Frederick Stevens v. Paterson & Newark R.R. Co., 34 N.J.L. 532 (E. & A.
1870).
131. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 34, § 25 (West 1999); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 40, § 8C (West 1999).
132. E-mail from Andrew J. Ley, Attorney for Chandler, to John Tenaglia, J.D.
Candidate, Pace University School of Law (Jan. 7, 2003, 18:09:00 EST) (on file with
author) [hereinafter "Email from Ley"].
133. Id.
134. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 580.
135. Id.
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The Commissioners had a more plausible statutory authority
available to secure public access to the beach: Massachusetts Gen-
eral Law Annotated, chapter 34 ("Chapter 34"), section 25.136
Under this statute:
[C]ommissioners may, subject to appropriation, acquire by emi-
nent domain, or by purchase or otherwise, the fee or other lesser
interest in such real property within their respective counties as
may be necessary to maintain, improve, protect, limit the future
use of or otherwise conserve and properly utilize open spaces,
and may control and manage same; provided that such acquisi-
tion has been approved by the department of environmental
conservation and the conservation committee of the city or town
within such land lies, or if such city or town has no conservation
committee . . . by two thirds vote of board of selectmen . .137
The Commissioners could have attempted to secure the land in
question under the authority granted in the above statute. In-
deed, the court stated in a footnote that although "open space" is
not expressly defined in Chapter 34, section 25, it would include
space on a public beach. 138 The court reasoned that Chapter 12,
section liD, includes "'open spaces' in a noninclusive list of land
that may be subject to 'damage to the environment': 'seashores,
dunes, marine resources, underwater archaeological resources,
wetlands, open spaces, natural areas, parks or historic districts or
sites."' 39 Although this statute appears to be the more appropri-
ate avenue for the Commissioners to have traveled, it would also
have been a more expensive and time-consuming avenue to travel.
Even if the Commissioners agreed that the beach access points
were open spaces within the definition of the statute and that it
should be taken by eminent domain in order to conserve and/or
protect the future use of the same, the Commissioners would still
have had to develop a conservation plan and have that plan ap-
proved by the State Department of Environmental Protection and
the Nantucket County Conservation Committee. 140
It is the additional obstacles in the process under the above-
mentioned statute that likely prompted the Commissioners to pro-
136. Id. at 585.
137. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 34, § 25 (West 1999).
138. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 585 n.7.
139. Id. See also Boston Ass'n of Sch. Adm'rs & Supervisors v. Boston Ret. Bd., 419
N.E.2d 277 (Mass. 1981) (stating a statute's "generic phrase" takes its meaning from
an analysis of the whole).
140. See Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 586.
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ceed under the less burdensome highway statute. Indeed, Mr.
Ley, in discussing the Commissioners' actions, stated that he be-
lieves the Commissioners proceeded under the highway statute
because there were "fewer obstacles in terms of time, money and
public process." 141 He explained that at the public hearing, the
Commissioners were talking to a tribunal who, in his opinion, had
already made up its mind to support the Commissioners in their
proposed takings. 142 Therefore, the Commissioners likely be-
lieved they could successfully proceed under the highway statute
and circumvent the additional processes needed to obtain ap-
proval from the Department of Environmental Protection and lo-
cal Conservation Commission. Thus, by proceeding under
Chapter 34, section 25, the Commissioners would have had to ad-
dress cost and need issues that, according to Mr. Ley, were a con-
cern of the Commissioners.143 Although the highway statute also
required a hearing, the forum was far from neutral, since the
Commissioners themselves comprised the tribunal holding the
hearing.'44
For the Commissioners' not to proceed under Chapter 34, sec-
tion 25, seems unusual, even in light of the apparent obstacles of
time and money. In 1984, Nantucket formed the nation's first lo-
cal land trust, the Nantucket Land Bank, whose primary purpose
was to acquire "open space." 145 The Land Bank has acquired over
1,000 acres of open space since 1984;146 thus, not only is there an
interest on the part of the bank to acquire open land, but it has
been successful in doing so. This suggests that Nantucket is not
opposed to the public acquisition of open space if needed to foster
conservation. If the Commissioners were so concerned about pre-
serving open access to the beach, why did they not argue, pursu-
ant to Chapter 34, section 25, that the "access points" in question
were in fact open space needed for conservation purposes? On an
island that appears willing to acquire open space for the better-
ment of its residents and visitors alike, this argument would ap-
pear plausible. Although it may be suggested that the
Commissioners, Land Bank, and Conservation Foundation may
share divergent views on conservation, the fact remains that the
141. E-mail from Ley, supra note 132.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 4.
146. Id.
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Commissioners could have attempted to acquire the financing nec-
essary to acquire the privately owned beach-front property by emi-
nent domain under Chapter 34, section 25.
Another statutory avenue the Commissioners could have ex-
plored was the acquisition of land by eminent domain, pursuant to
Massachusetts General Law Annotated, chapter 40 ("Chapter
40"), section 8C. 147 This provision provides that a city or town,
after establishing a conservation commission, may "upon the writ-
ten request of the commission, take land by eminent domain
under chapter seventy-nine .. .in any land or waters located in
such city or town," as is deemed necessary to "acquire, maintain,
improve, protect, limit the future use of or otherwise conserve and
properly utilize open spaces in land and water areas within [the
commission's] city or town. ... ".,148 Nantucket already has a con-
servation commission, 49 which makes this an even more viable
statutory avenue that the Commissioners could have pursued.
As with Chapter 34, section 25, the same disincentives exist if
the Commissioners chose to proceed under Chapter 40, section 8C.
For instance, the Commissioners would be required to develop and
submit a conservation plan which would be subject to approval by
a two-thirds vote of the town counsel. 50 This vote would be neces-
sary because the land in question would have to be acquired by
eminent domain. 51 Thus, this statute would force upon the Com-
missioners a process that is more expensive and time-consuming
than proceeding under the highway statute. However, since the
intent of the Commissioners was in fact to conserve the access
points to the beach, this time-consuming and perhaps more expen-
sive process is necessary. As discussed above, combating erosion
through different types of conservation efforts is a complex pro-
cess, which requires the collaboration of different government
agencies. The plain language of Chapter 34, section 25, suggests
the Massachusetts state legislature believed that this more expen-
sive and time-consuming process was necessary for conservation.
Since the Chandler court properly identified the intent of the
Commissioners as conservatory in nature, it appropriately dis-
147. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 585.
148. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 8C (West 1999).
149. Conservation Commission homepage, at http://www.nantucket-ma.gov/de-
partments/concom.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2003).
150. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40, § 14 (West 1999).
151. 8 Op. Att'y. Gen. 73, 83 (1969).
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cussed, in dictum, statutes that offered a more plausible basis for
the taking of privately owned land. 15 2
Lastly, the Commissioners also decided not to proceed with
the takings under Chapter 40, section 14.153 This statute empow-
ers selectmen, which in Nantucket are the commissioners, to:
[T]ake by eminent domain under chapter seventy-nine, any
land, easement or right therein within the city or town not al-
ready appropriated to public use, for any municipal purpose for
which the purchase or taking of land, easement or right therein
is not otherwise authorized or directed by statute [provided
that] the taking or purchase.., has previously been authorized
... by vote of the town, nor until an appropriation of money, to
be raised by loan or otherwise, has been made for the purpose by
a two thirds vote of the city council or by a two thirds vote of the
town, and no lot of land shall be purchased for any municipal
purpose by any city subject to this section for a price more than
twenty-five per cent in excess of its average assessed valuation
during the previous three years.' 54
The Commissioners could posit the argument that securing public
access to the beach is a "municipal purpose" within the meaning of
the statute and that the land has not already been appropriated
for public use.' 55 Although the Commissioners would have to de-
fine the "municipal purpose" and appropriate the necessary fi-
nancing to obtain authorization from this statute to take said
land, this statute still appears more plausible on its face than the
highway statute.
The likely reason this statute was less attractive to the Com-
missioners was because it required them to jump more procedural
hurdles. For instance, if the Commissioners were to effectuate a
valid taking of the land in question for purposes of conservation, it
would have to be founded upon a written request by the conserva-
tion commission. 5 6 Further, there would be financing require-
ments that must be fulfilled prior to the takings order being valid;
as the statute articulates, "[ulpon a [two-thirds] vote, a city or
town may expend monies in the fund, if any, established under the
provision of this section for the purpose of paying, in whole or in
part, any damages for which such city or town may be liable by
152. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 584-85.
153. Id. at 585.
154. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40, § 14 (West 1999).
155. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 580-81.
156. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40, § 8C (West 1999).
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reason of any such taking."1 57 Thus, under this statute, the Com-
missioners would have to provide the conservation commission
with a written request proving need and raise the necessary fi-
nancing before the town could even consider the takings order.158
The court in this case properly framed the issue, analyzed the
facts, applied the appropriate cannons of statutory construction,
and in the end, rendered the just decision. The Commissioners
had no intention of using the plaintiffs' beachfront land for con-
structing a highway; however, it proceeded under the highway
statute to further its conservation efforts. Although the court's
decision precluded the Commissioners from taking the land pur-
suant to Chapter 82, section 7, the questions that remain are:
whether or not the plaintiffs' land is safe from takings efforts; and
what is the scope and impact of the decision rendered by the
Chandler court?
Mr. Ley suggested that the plaintiffs' beachfront land is not
safe from a future taking because there are other ways to take
access points.'5 9 He pointed out that several citizen articles for
town meeting have already been submitted, which supports the
notion that the plaintiffs' beachfront property may still be
taken.160 A debate that has likely ensued amongst the town plan-
ners, as a result of this case, is whether it is cost-effective to pro-
ceed under a statute, such as Chapter 34, section 25, that has a
more detailed procedural process. In discussing the impact of the
case on the issue of takings in either Nantucket County or the
state of Massachusetts, Mr. Ley stated that the case has had a
minimal impact.161 He explained that the case "has been quoted
in a few subsequent cases, but only with respect to statutory con-
struction issues."' 62 Mr. Ley suggested, however, "had the case
gone the other way," there would have been, as he stated, "all
sorts of mischief wrought not just in Nantucket, but wherever
some government entity could exercise highway lay-out author-
ity."163 Indeed, a decision by the Chandler court in favor of the
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. E-mail from Ley, supra note 132.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. See also Perry v. Commonwealth, 780 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Mass. 2002) (citing
Chandler for statutory interpretation principles); Wong v. Univ. of Mass., 777 N.E.2d
161, 162 (Mass. 2002) (citing Chandler for the proposition that it is appropriate to
examine legislative history when interpreting statutes).
163. E-mail from Ley, supra note 132.
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Commissioners would have validated their ability to exercise au-
thority not explicitly granted to them by an enabling statute; a
ruling contrary to the basic tenets of administrative law.
V. Conclusion
The authority to exercise the right of eminent domain is a
powerful right delegated to local governing authorities, like the
Commissioners. The Commissioners proceeded under a statute
authorizing the taking of land for the purpose of constructing, al-
tering, or repairing highways, but disavowed any intent to do so
with the land taken. 164
Thus, the court properly concluded that the Commissioners
acted outside of the scope of Chapter 82, section 7, and invalidated
the takings orders. 165 The court properly rejected the Commis-
sioners' arguments that the taken land would be connecting "ex-
isting public ways" and that Chapter 82 did not require
pavement.166 There were also alternative statutory avenues
available to the Commissioners, which the court considered more
viable, but which the Commissioners decided not to pursue. 167
The court itself suggested that the Commissioners might have de-
clined to proceed under Chapter 34, section 25, because it was
more restrictive of the Commissioners' authority than Chapter
82.168 Although the precise reasoning for the Commissioners' ac-
tions is unknown, the fact remains that a valid exercise of the
right of eminent domain requires authorities, like the Commis-
sioners, to work within the narrow confines of the enabling
statute. 169
The court's holding and reasoning in Chandler was sound and
consistent with the purpose of Chapter 82, section 7. Coastal con-
servation is an important objective of the state of Massachusetts
and Nantucket County. However, with an economy dependent in
large part on tourism and second-home development, Nantucket
finds herself in a precarious position. The Commissioners are try-
ing to ensure that "rights of way" to certain beaches in the Surf-
side area remain open to the public in the future, a result that will
benefit the tourism industry and island's economy, while at the
164. Chandler, 772 N.E.2d 578, 579-82.
165. Id. at 586.
166. Id. at 583.
167. See id. at 586.
168. Id. at 586.
169. Id.
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same time try to be sensitive to the interests of beach-front prop-
erty owners. In balancing these interests, there are appropriate
statutory avenues the Commissioners can travel in order to deter-
mine if a taking of privately owned land is needed to further pub-
lic conservationist ends. In Chandler, the Commissioners did not
proceed under the appropriate statute in trying to effectuate a
taking by eminent domain; thus, they were properly precluded
from using the Massachusetts state highway statute as a device
for furthering conservation.
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